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bution to the culture of the community.30 Nevertheless, the doctrine of unjust
enrichment compels the conclusion that judicial relief should be available to the
originator of material which has been appropriated. By the same token agencies
are entitled to protection against blackmail and honest but unfounded claims.
The present framework of common-law protection of "hot ideas" could probably
be strengthened if litigation were discouraged through statutes similar to the
federal copyright provisions, which impose reasonable attorneys' fees as part of
the unsuccessful litigant's costs. 3' In addition where the material is unsolicited

the requirements of "concrete combination" and novelty should be strictly
enforced against the possibility of invalid claims. However, agencies which
actively solicit material from free lance professionals and amateurs should be
held to more stringent standards of liability. Any other rule would encourage
controversy and handicap just and effective judicial administration of the
"hot idea" industries.

VERBAL ACTS AND IDEAS-THE COMMON SENSE
OF FREE SPEECH
Conviction for a breach of the peace may conceal a threat to the right of
freedom of speech. The only cases in which the United States Supreme Court
has been confronted by the presence of both concepts' did not require full
exposition of their possible inconsistency. But a recent Illinois decision, City of
the question into sharp relief.
Chicago v. Terminiello2
This problem, like any other involving the right of free speech, necessitates
an understanding of the reasons that some speech is protected while other
speech is punishable. The protection of the First Amendment may be invoked
only when the words used are intended to convey ideas. Even though hostile in
nature, these words will be protected because the "[u]ltimate good desire is
better reached by free trade in ideas-that the test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. . ...
2brings

30For a development of the theory that thoughts are protected not so much for considerations of value but as instances "of the more general right of the individual to be let alone,"
see Brandeis and Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 204-5 (i8go). For a suggestion that abstract ideas are unprotected because a mere abstraction is not of sufficient
value to society, see Logan, Legal Protection of Ideas, 4 Mo. L. Rev. 239, 240 (i939). But see
36 Col. L. Rev. 1375, 1376 (x936), noting Grombach Productions, Inc. v. Waring, 293 N.Y.
609, 59 N.E. 2d 425 (1944), for the suggestion that ideas are not given the status of property
because of the benefits to society from their free dissemination.
3' See Caruthers v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 9o6, 908-9 (N.Y., 1937). The
applicable section of the Copyright Act is 35 Stat. 1084 (1909), I7 U.S.C.A. § 40 (1937).
I Two important free speech cases have involved breach of peace prosecutions: Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (i94o); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (z942); see
also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (I94i).
'400 Ill. 23, 79 N.E. 2d 39 (1948).
3 Schenck

v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,

52 (I919).

NOTES

The characteristic of speech, then, which merits special consideration is its
ability to convey truth. Alexander Meiklejohn has called this the public interest in speech as opposed to the private interest: Speech of public interest is
absolutely protected by the First Amendment, but speech of private interest
may be reasonably regulated or punished.4 Words of idea-conveying nature,
even though objectionable, will be protected because of the benefit to the public
interest. But words of interest only to the individual will be punished when a
different area of the public interest has been injured. Punishment follows according to what has been called the "normal criminal law of words." s For example, objectionable words may be punished because they are obscene and
abusive or because they urge another to commit a crime.
Words of purely private interest may, of course, be so confined in their use
as to preclude punishment. 6 Thus, the defendant in the Terminiello case argued
that his speech, made before an invited audience which had gained entrance to
the meeting by presenting mailed cards of admission, was a private affair and
could not have breached the public peace. In order to pass on the validity of
such a claim, the courts must define the notion of a breach of the public peace.
The presence of a statute applicable only to breaches in a public place makes
the formulation easier to reach, although even in such cases it is frequently
troublesome. 7 Where the statute applies to both private and public places, a
definitive test is more difficult to find. Some of the standards suggested in the
cases depend on the number of people disturbed,' others on whether the people
present were invited. 9 Most courts, however, resort to an indefinite statement
that the time, place, and circumstances must be taken into consideration."
All these tests are inadequate because they fail to state the offense against the
public which the breach of the peace prosecution is supposed to punish. This
inadequacy may be avoided by an examination of the different injuries to the
public concealed by the vague generic term "breach of the peace." An example
of the all-inclusive nature of the breach of peace action for the use of objectionable words is the court's finding in the Terminiello case that the defendant had
breached the peace in five different ways: i) The defendant called members of
the audience "scum," an abusive word."' 2) The defendant's "opprobrious, abu4Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-government 63 (948).
5 Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 149 (i94i).
6 People v. Monnier, 28o N.Y. 77, I9 N.E. 2d 789 (I939) (abusive words used over a telephone held not a breach of the peace). People v. McCauliff, 267 N.Y. 58i, io6 N.E. 59o
(i935) (abusive words used by husband toward wife in their home held not breach of peace).
7 State v. Weekly, 29 Ind. 2o6 (1867); Carwile v. State, 35 Ala. 392 (i86o); Taylor v. State,
22 Ala. i5 (1853). In all these cases the courts had to define a public place to establish the crime
of affray, related to breach of the peace.
8 People v. Reid, i8o N.Y. Misc. 289, 40 N.Y.S. 2d 793 (1943).

9Austin v. State, 124 S.W. 636 (Tex. Crim. App., igio).
"'City of Chicago v. Terminiello, 332 Ill. App. 17, 74 N.E. 2d 45 (1947).
"City of Chicago v. Terminiello, 400 Ill. 23, 32, 79 N.E. 2d 39, 44 (1948).
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sive and insulting stories ...incited an actual breach of the peace within the
auditorium."2 3) "[T]he defendant's conduct in scheduling an address in a
large auditorium, invited a storm of protest... [which] resulted in innumerable acts of violence."'3 4) "As to the majority of the audience, defendant, by
his provocative and inflammatory utterances ...instilled in them the fear of
revolution, domination and murder by what he described as the criminal Jewish
element in America. . . .."4 5) The defendant's "speech tended to incite the
majority of his audience to immediate violence against the angry mob outside."Is
Of these grounds for conviction, the first comes closest to the historical
pattern of a breach of the peace action. Abusive words have been punished because they tended to provoke a fight.x6 Lewd, obscene, profane, libelous, and
insulting or fighting words are punished because "their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."'7 But this statement
attributes to insulting words two different objectionable qualities--such words
"injure" or "tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." The element of
injury characterizes the word as an act with the effect of a blow. Yet most
courts justify punishment for breach of the peace on the sole ground that
abusive and offensive words tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace
by causing a fight. 8
This dichotomy is also evident in another verbal crime, criminal libel. Punishment for this crime was first justified because libelous words tended to cause
a breach of the peace. In modern cases, the breach of the peace is not necessarily
considered; libelous words can be punished merely because they injure the object of the
libel. The threat to the public peace is no longer needed as a justi9
fication.1

The modem justification sometimes used in criminal libel can perhaps be
understood by realizing that an injury to reputation and character is more
tangible than one to feelings or peace of mind. Peace of mind is easily disturbed, and angry words are frequently used. In the breach of peace actions
the courts, by emphasizing the threat to public peace presented by a fight, have
been able to contain within reasonable bounds o the instances in which abusive
words will be punished.

2

'4 Ibid., at 33, 44.
X3Ibid.
"sIbid., at 33, 45.
OThis is the rationale stated in Chaplinsky v. New Hamphsire, 315 U.S. 568

,2Ibid.

(1942).

1Ibid., at 572 quoting Chafee, op. cit. supra note 5.
ISState v. Steger, 94 W.Va. 576, 119 S.E. 682 (1923).
19Burdick, Law of Crime § 785 (1946); May, Law of Crimes § 1z5 (Sears's and Weihofen's
ed., 1938), citing 19 A.L.R. 1523 (1922).
30 Ware v. Loveridge, 75 Mich. 488, 42 N.W. 997 (1889).
"1It is not clear from the cases whether the threat of a fight in itself is a sufficient breach of
peace or whether the threat of the fight must disturb the public represented by one or more on-
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The dual basis for the punishment of offensive words explains the courts'
difficulty in determining just when the public has been disturbed. Under the
tendency-to-provoke-a-fight rationale, the courts seek some member of the public at large who might have been disturbed.- Under the injurious-nature-of-the2
words-themselves approach, the abused person himself is the "public.' 3
The second and third findings of breach of the peace in the Terminiello case
are not easily fitted into the ordinary pattern of breach of the peace prosecution. In the third example the court intimated that the defendant should not
have scheduled the meeting.because he knew it would provoke others to breach
the peace' 4 -a form of previous restraint. In the second example the court
blamed the speaker for the intemperate reaction of his unfriendly listeners: a
reaction not to abusive words directed at the listener, such as the word "scum,"
but to distorted propaganda aimed to persuade his audience.
The significant difference between conviction for using words like "scum"
and conviction for the rest of the speech is illustrated in Cantwellv. Connecticut2s
6
and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.2
In the Cantwell case the Catholic listeners
were angered by the vilification of their religion by Cantwell, a Jehovah's
Witness, and threatened to strike him. The court held that he was not guilty of
common-law breach of the peace. His exaggeration and vilification were excesses
of discussion and persuasion which a society interested in preserving freedom of
speech had to accept. In the Chaplinsky case, calling a marshal a "damned
Fascist" and "damned racketeer" was held to be a breach of the peace even
though there was no evidence that the marshal was angered or tempted to strike
Chaplinsky. The two cases dramatically point out the difference between the
word as an act and the word as an idea. It is therefore desirable that the statute
or ordinance be directed specifically at abusive and offensive words so that
lookers. See Morris v. District of Columbia, 31 A. 2d 652 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C., 1943), where
an insult to a single passenger by a taxicab driver was held to be disorderly conduct because
it tended to cause a breach of the peace.
"A husband, finding his wife in a hotel room with another man, shot and killed him. The
wife was held not guilty of a diversion tending to a breach of the peace. "Only the parties immediately concerned were disturbed thereby." City of Chicago v. Murray, 333 IIl. App. 233,
237, 77 N.E. 2d 452, 454 (i947).
23 "We would be loath to hold that language which would insult a man, would not be insulting to a female, because by reason of her sex and gentler nature she would not resent it with

blows." Benson v. State, 68 Ala. 513, 514 (x881).

Because a police officer is not expected to fight even when provoked, some courts, unlike the
Supreme Court in the Chaplinsky case, have held that insulting an officer is not a breach of the
peace. People v. Lukowsky, 94 N.Y. Misc. 5oo, 159 N.Y. Supp. 599 (1916); State v. Moore,
166 N.C. 371, 81 S.E. 693 (1914). Contra: Pavish v. Meyers, 129 Wash. 6o5, 225 Pac. 633
(1924) (insulting an officer is a breach of the peace because it tends to lessen respect for law
and order). People v. Fenton, 102 N.Y. Misc. 43, 168 N.Y. Supp. 725 (1917); Elmore v. State,
iS Ga. App. 461, 83 S.E. 799. (1914).

24 The same argument has been used to justify statutes forbidding the display of red flags.
People v. Burman, 154 Mich. iso, 117 N.W. 589 (I9O8).
2s 310 U.S. 296 (194o).
26 35 U.S. 568 (1942).
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courts are not tempted to label the expression of unpopular ideas "breach of the
peace."
The danger to free speech in a broader statute is that an opposition group
has the power to create a situation tense and threatening enough to expose the
speaker to a ready-made breach of peace prosecution. Rather than provoking
a prosecution against the speaker, such action demands vigorous measures
against the opposition.27 If the police are unable to manage opportunistic
troublemaking, free-speech rights are meaningless.
The last two examples in the Terminiello case charge the speaker with instilling fears, anger, and hatred in his sympathetic listeners and with inciting
them to immediate violence. The breadth of the breach of the peace action is
indicated by the inclusion of incitement, generally an offense included in the
criminal law of solicitations.2' But the propriety of such inclusion should be
determined by reference not only to the law of solicitations but to the closely
related law of attempts.
A solicitation is the mere urging of one person by another to commit a crime.
The person solicited need not be at all responsive to the solicitation. He may
reject it entirely.29 He may be the one who discloses the crime to the authorities.3o Still the solicitation has been held criminal. There is no talk of success,
no talk of how close the solicitation may have come to bringing about the crime.
An attempt, however, is a progression toward a crime which falls short of consummation but is still punishable.3y The acts of preparation must come close
to success before they become criminal.32
If the court meant to apply the standards of the laws of solicitations and attempts, Terminiello may well be punished for a solicitation. But even though the
ideas expressed may have been unpopular distortions, the speech could nevertheless have been considered of a sufficient idea-conveying nature to merit
protection for its public interest. If this is so, the speech presents the problem
of the protection of rights of free speech rather than the problem of punishment
for criminal use of words. And the traditional control used in free speech cases
is the clear and present danger test. 33
27 See Rebecca West's description of the pains taken by the London police to protect
Fascist meetings from Communist attacks and Communist meetings from Fascist attacks. Miss
West's articles also contain an informal report of a recent English case dealing with a breach of
the peace prosecution for Anti-Semitic remarks. West, A Reporter at Large, 24 New Yorker,
No. 24, at 24 (Aug. 7, 1948); Ibid. No. 25, at 26 (Aug. 14, 1948).
28 The crime is generally called "solicitation" rather than "incitement" in criminal-law
terminology. Perhaps the word "incitement" is better used to describe words which provoke
an attack against the speaker.
29 State v. Hampton, 21o N.C. 283, i86 S.E. 251 (1936) (the defendant was held guilty of
a crime even though his solicitation to bum a neighbor's dwelling was spumed).
30 State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 266 (1828) (the defendant wrote a letter to another man's wife
soliciting her to commit adultery with him; the information seems to have been sworn to by
the wife).
3 May, Law of Crimes § 130 (Sears's and Weihofen's ed., 1938).
-- People v. Murray, 14 Cal. i59 (1859).
33 "[Tlhe 'clear and present danger' language of the Schenck case has afforded practical

NOTES
Interestingly enough, the clear and present danger test had its source in the
law of attempt, 34 since it was first enunciated in Schenck v. United States.35
In the Schenck case the prosecution was for a violation of the Espionage Act of
197. Section 3 of this Act 6 was couched in terms of attempts; it described no
verbal stage of the crime. As Justice Sanford later stated in Gitlow v. New York,37
the clear and present danger test was used in the Schenck case to determine
whether the verbal acts came close enough to the acts described in the statute
to be punishable.
A different situation is presented when the statute specifically makes unlawful certain verbal acts, such as inciting (soliciting) people to violent overthrow
of the government. The latter type of statute fixes the level at which verbal acts
are unlawful and does not permit the application of the clear and present danger
test in the same manner as in the Schenck case. This type of statute is equivalent to the criminal law of solicitation, which punishes the mere urging to crime
without reference to success. Therefore, as Justice Brandeis pointed out in
Whitney v. California,3 the clear and present danger test needed extension to
ward off the damaging blow to freedom of speech which could be struck by a
simple legislative determination that use of words under any circumstances was
unlawful. To avoid this encroachment, the standard was refrained to test the
validity of a statute labeling a verbal act as unlawful: If there is no clear and
present danger of substantive evil presented by the use of the words, then to
call such speech unlawful is unconstitutional.39
When, therefore, the words of solicitation appear to have public interest or
idea content, the ordinary law of solicitation collides with the extended variation of the clear and present danger test. Which law shall control?40 The answer
guidance in a great variety of cases in which the scope of constitutional protections of freedom
of expression was in issue." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262 (1941).
34 "But as this court has declared... the test to be applied-as in the case of criminal at-

tempts and incitements-is not remote or possible effect. There must be the clear and present
danger." Brandeis, J., dissenting in Schaefer v. United States, 25, U.S. 468, 486 (1920); Riesman, Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition, 3 Pub. Policy 33, 38 (1942); Chafee, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 23, 46, 47, 391.
3S 249 U.S. 47 (i919).

3640 Stat. 219 (1917), 50 U.S.C.A. § 33 (i928).
37 "[It] was manifestly intended, as shown by the context, to apply only in cases of this

class, and has no application to those like the present, where the legislative body itself has
previously determined the danger of substantive evil arising from utterances of a specified
character." 268 U.S. 652, 671 (1925). The difference between the two situations has been
pointed out in Dunne v. United States, 138 F. 2d 137 (C.C.A. 8th, 1943), and Commonwealth
v. Lazar, io3 Pa. Super. 417 (1931).
3' 274 U.S. 357 (1927).

39 See Thornhil v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (i94o); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937);
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).

40 Holmes seems to have looked only to the law of attempts as the source of the clear and
present danger test, overlooking the fact that there is a clash between the law of solicitation
and the extended variation of the test. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925); Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 16,628 (i9'9). Chafee follows the Holmes view. He cites Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 59 N.E. 55 (ipoi), an attempt case, as an early statement by
Holmes of the clear and present danger test. Chafee, op. cit. supra note 5, at 391.
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depends on the degree to which the words constitute dissemination of ideas
rather than incitement to crime. The public-private criterion 'vill determine
which legal context, criminal solicitation or freedom of speech, the words will
evoke.4' The distinction is not easy to make. In the Whitney case Justice
Brandeis attempted to differentiate between advocacy and incitement, intimating that they are far apart 2 Advocicy of ideas is useful to society and must be
safeguarded, while incitement may be punished. But in one sense all words
are incitements. The choice of punishment for solicitation or protection for
advocacy under the clear and present danger test will depend on how receptive
the courts are to the public-interest, idea-conveying nature of the words.
The application of this analysis to breach of the peace prosecutions is important because the dormancy of the law of solicitations has prompted reliance
on catch-all breach of the peace statutes. In the absence of a concerted effort
by the states to codify the common law of solicitation,43 it may be expected that
a breach of the peace prosecution will be brought against a speaker who incites
his listeners to violence.44 But such a prosecution need not present any special
danger to freedom of speech.45 If the words are deserving of protection, the
extended phase of the clear and present danger test can be incorporated into a
breach of peace trial. If the words are exclusively words of incitement, they are
a breach of the peace when uttered and will be punished accordingly. The burden is placed on the judge and jury to keep open minds, to reject the impulse to
label unpopular advocacy as incitement. The burden is on the speaker to advocate rather than incite if he wishes to be protected.46The burden is on the law to
work out reasonable methods by which incitements can be punished and
advocacy protected. One step in answering all three challenges would be to
break down the sweeping breach of peace ordinances into carefully phrased elements directed at particular offenses. This partial solution attacks the problem
at its most accessible level by aiding the courts in the recognition of free speech
situations in their proper perspective and in the application of appropriate
controls.
4' Two New York cases reveal how the judge's reaction to the words as abusive or persuasive
may control the result. People v. McWilliams, 22 N.Y.S. 2d 571 (i94o); People v. Downer,
6 N.Y.S. 2d 566 (1938).
42Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (i927).
43 Curran, Solicitation: A Substantive Crime, 17 Minn. L. Rev. 499 (1933).
44 People v. Most, 171 N.Y. 423, 64 N.E. 175 (1902).
4Thurman Arnold suggests that "the making of incendiary speeches and the publication
of anti-social doctrine are more logically classified under the power to punish common law
crimes than under solicitation or attempt." Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall
of an Abstraction, 40 Yale L. J. 53 (i93o). The suggestion seems to be that such speeches are
punishable as breaches of the peace.
46 "Words are not only the keys of persuasion, but the triggers of action, and those which
have no purport but to counsel the violation of law cannot by any latitude of interpretation be
a part of that public opinion which is the final source of government in a democratic state."
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. 535, 54o (D.C. N.Y., 1917).

